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Can GATT Article III Recover From Its Head-On
Collision With United States-Taxes on
Automobiles?
James H. Snelson
Like the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion,1 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2
seeks to limit the ability of each individual government to insu-
late its constituent industries from outside competition. In the-
ory GATT Article III prohibits internal taxes and other
regulations that enhance the competitive position of domestic
producers relative to that of foreign producers. 3 In practice,
however, GATT tribunals have not yet resolved the issue of
where Article III's limits begin.
The GATT dispute settlement proceeding titled United
States: Taxes on Automobiles provides a recent and controversial
installment in the evolution of Article III. In 1993, the Euro-
1. The Commerce Clause provides that "The Congress shall have the
Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several States." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, c. 3. The Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) doctrine established
that this text operates not only as a positive grant of regulatory power to Con-
gress, but also as a limitation upon the power of state governments to regulate
interstate commerce. For example, in 1951 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down as violative of the DCC a municipal ordinance requiring milk sold locally
to be pasteurized within five miles of town. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951). The ordinance unreasonably discriminated against non-
local producers. Id. at 354. For a review of DCC jurisprudence, see Daniel A.
Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye
View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1411-18 (1994).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT].
3. GATT, supra note 2, art. III, para. 1. The first paragraph of Article III
states the broad purpose of the entire Article:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other inter-
nal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the in-
ternal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or propor-
tions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.
Id.
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pean Community (EC) asserted that three U.S. laws-the Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) law and the luxury and
gas-guzzler taxes-discriminated against imported cars and
were thus inconsistent with Article III.4 Just in time for the
congressional debate on U.S. membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO),5 the United States: Taxes on Automobiles
Panel concluded that Article III should not excessively curtail
the legislative freedom of member nations. Rejecting traditional
analysis of Article III claims,6 the Panel reasoned that only
those taxes enacted with the "aim and effect" of protecting do-
mestic industry fail Article III's national treatment require-
ments. Because Congress enacted the luxury and gas-guzzler
taxes to effect "legitimate" policy objectives, the Panel found no
Article III violation. 7
Congress designed the challenged measures to ease the ef-
fects of economic recessions and achieve greater independence
from foreign oil producers.8 The powerful U.S. automobile in-
dustry-reeling from fuel crises, import competition, and unan-
ticipated changes in demand during the 1970s and 1980s-was
an important factor for the government to consider in respond-
ing to both these problems. 9 Although the luxury and gas-guz-
zler taxes do not explicitly favor domestic producers over foreign
4. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States: Taxes on Automobiles,
GATT Doc. DS31/R, (panel report not adopted), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397,
para. 1.1 (1994).
5. On December 8, 1994, President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, which approved the agreement establishing the WTO. Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 480, 4809 (1994). Congress passed the Act on December
1, 1994. Id. During the congressional debate on the Act, Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch hailed the United States: Taxes on Automobiles Panel report as an indi-
cation that U.S. membership in the WTO would not infringe upon Congress'
legislative freedom. 140 CONG. REc. S15,112-13 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994).
6. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text. In a separate analysis,
the Panel found that certain provisions of the CAFE law were inconsistent with
Article 111:4, which proscribes non-tax protectionist regulations. The Panel also
considered whether GATT Article XX excepted the CAFE law from the provi-
sions of Article III. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at paras.
5.56-5.67.
This Comment will focus on the Panel's detailed analysis of the challenged
luxury and gas-guzzler taxes under Article 111:2 and allude to those issues that
are pertinent as well to other provisions of Article III. This edition includes a
thorough review of various panels' analyses of Article XX. See Cynthia M.
Maas, Should the WTO Expand GATT Article XX: An Analysis of United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 415 (1996).
8. See infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 11-46 and accompanying text.
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producers, European auto makers bear a disproportionately
large share of the resultant regulatory burdens.' 0
This Comment analyzes Article III's limitation on facially
neutral internal legislation and recommends an interpretation
that preserves legislative freedom without sacrificing restraints
on regulatory protectionism. Part I summarizes the dynamics of
the U.S. auto market since the 1970s and describes previous
GATT analysis of Article III claims. Part II outlines the Panel's
reasoning in United States: Taxes on Automobiles. Part III ex-
amines the shortcomings of the Panel's analysis and the virtues
of alternative approaches. Part IV concludes that the Panel con-
ceded too much to new nationalist dogma and that GATT's fu-
ture might be better served by an Article III that regulates
incidental as well as intentional protectionism.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE MARKET IN THE 1970s, 1980s AND
1990s
In 1973 domestic automobile manufacturers sold a historic
9.7 million new cars" in the United States for a total price of
$40.4 billion,' 2 more than $130 billion in current dollars.' 3 The
Big Three U.S. auto companies, 14 which controlled 80% of the
U.S. new car market, reported record earnings as a result.'5 A
variety of factors, however, conspired to confound these compa-
10. Similarly, the municipal ordinance in Dean Milk was neutral on its
face. The ordinance required all producers, whether located in Madison or Chi-
cago or Minneapolis, to pasteurize their milk within five miles of town. 340
U.S. at 350. The ordinance's burdens, however, fell more harshly on non-local
producers. Id. at 354.
11. MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS
& FIGURES '76 15 (1976).
12. See 1985 Market Data Book, AuToMO'rIvE NEWS, Apr. 24, 1985, at 53
(reporting that the average transaction price per new domestic car in 1973 was
$4,180).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1995 492 (1995) (reporting Consumer Price Indexes for all urban con-
sumers of 44.4 and 148.2, respectively, for 1973 and 1994).
14. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler are referred to collectively as the
Big Three.
15. 1985 Market Data Book, supra note 12, at 25. The Big Three reported
net income of approximately $3.56 billion on sales of approximately $70.6 bil-
lion, including worldwide auto and truck sales and financing revenue, in 1973.
Two years later, the same companies reported net income of only $1.2 billion, a
67% decline. By 1980, the Big Three were in dire financial straits, combining
for a net loss of $4 billion. ROBERT SOBEL, CAR WARS 262 (1984).
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nies soon after their banner year, and in 1975 American produ-
cers sold only 7 million new cars domestically. 16
1. The Fuel Crises
During 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) began to raise the price of oil dramatically. 17
In little more than a year the price of OPEC crude oil quadru-
pled, but U.S. price controls' 8 prevented this increase from be-
ing fully reflected at American gas stations. 19 A panic ensued,
however, when OPEC responded to American support of Israel
in the Arab-Israeli war by announcing an embargo against the
United States in October 1973.20 The resulting gas shortage
sparked domestic concern for automobile fuel economy.
The fuel shortage and price controls ended in 1974, and gas-
oline became readily available again, albeit at a price nearly
50% higher than that observed one year earlier.21 Various U.S.
government measures stabilized the pump price of gasoline at
50 to 60 cents per gallon for the next several years. 22 In the
spring of 1979, the Iranian revolution led to another oil
16. 1985 Market Data Book, supra note 12, at 22.
17. SOBEL, supra note 15, at 222-25. America's oil consumption doubled
during the 1950's and again in the 1960's. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., 10 Years
After Oil Crisis: Lessons Still Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1983, at Al. In
1970 domestic oil production reached its limit, but demand continued to grow.
Id. Foreign oil filled the void. Id. In the mid-1970's, after decades of submis-
sion to the major oil companies, the oil-rich nations of the Middle East recog-
nized their oligopoly power over oil prices and collaborated to keep prices high.
DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 451-59 (1986).
18. In response to concerns regarding rising inflation, Congress in 1970
granted the president authority to freeze wages, salaries, prices, and rents. A.
JAMES REICHLEY, CONSERVATIVES IN AN AGE OF CHANGE 215-16 (1981). Contin-
uing inflation and unemployment in 1971 led the Nixon administration to insti-
tute a new economic program, which included temporary wage and price
freezes, a 10% surcharge on imports, repeal of the 7% excise tax on automobiles,
suspension of dollar convertability into gold, and acceleration of an increase in
the personal tax exemption. Id. at 225. In 1972, an election year, the adminis-
tration sought to stimulate the economy by increasing federal spending and the
money supply. Id. at 226. When the controls were lifted late in 1973, prices for
consumer goods (including automobiles) skyrocketed. Id. at 228.
19. SOBEL, supra note 15, at 222-25.
20. Id. at 223; JOHN B. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 140
(1984).
21. SOBEL, supra note 15, at 224.
22. Id. at 224, 234. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 in-
cluded a complex system of supply allocations that insulated American consum-
ers from rising crude oil prices. RAE, supra note 20, at 141. The stable price of
gas during this period led to continuing consumer demand for large, fuel-ineffi-
cient cars, which the Big Three were ready and willing to produce. Id. at 142.
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shortage. By late 1979 gas was selling above the once inconceiv-
able price of one dollar per gallon.23 The high price of gasoline,
in conjunction with the 55 mile per hour speed limit24 and other
government actions, convinced many American car buyers that
"miles-per-gallon was far more important than miles-per-
hour."25
2. Imported Automobiles
As President Nixon announced wage and price freezes in
1971, the United States also imposed a 10% surtax on all im-
ports and ended dollar convertability into gold. 26 The govern-
ment took these steps to stem the flow of imports into the United
States, a flow that precipitated the first trade deficit since the
1800s. 2
7
Automobile imports accounted for a healthy portion of the
American trade deficit in the 1970s. From 1971 through 1975,
the United States imported $32.4 billion worth of new
automobiles, but exported only $9.4 billion.28 In 1970, Ameri-
cans bought 1.3 million imported new cars, roughly 15% of the
domestic new car market.29 By 1980 that figure rose to 2.4 mil-
lion imported new cars, a market share of more than 25%.30 In
the early 1970s, European and Japanese auto manufacturers
each accounted for roughly half of U.S. import sales.31 Since the
23. SOBEL, supra note 15, at 259-60.
24. The U.S. government imposed the 55 mile per hour national speed limit
as part of its response to the 1973 fuel crisis. RAE, supra note 20, at 140.
25. SOBEL, supra note 15, at 224.
26. Id. at 220.
27. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1976 825 (1976).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 847, 851.
29. 1985 Market Data Book, supra note 12, at 22, 25.
30. Id.
31. GRAEE P. MAXTON & JOHN WoRMALD, DRIvING OVER A CLFF? Busi-
NESS LESSONS FROM THE WORLD'S CAR INDusTRY 84-88 (1995). Four manufac-
turers have dominated West European car production since the 1970's:
Volkswagen (including Audi and Seat), Peugeot (including Citroen), Fiat (in-
cluding Lancia and Alfa Romeo), and Renault. JAMES M. LAUX, THE EUROPEAN
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 220-41. Of the major European car manufacturers, only
Volkswagen sells a significant number of cars in the United States (Renault has
not sold cars in the United States since 1986, Peugeot abandoned the American
market in 1992, and Fiat's annual U.S. sales are limited to a few hundred Alfa
Romeos). Id. at 237; 1990 Market Data Book, AUTOMOTIVE NEws, May 30, 1990,
at 27.
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late 1970s, however, Japanese manufacturers have controlled
more than 70% of the U.S. market for imported cars.32
3. The Modern U.S. Automobile Market
The U.S. auto market today comprises six basic segments:
budget and small cars, mid-range, upper mid-range, luxury,
sporty cars, and specialty cars.3 3 Many of these cars now com-
pete directly with the market for light trucks, nearly half of
which are minivans and sport-utility vehicles.3 4 The Big Three
dominate the U.S. light truck market, which expanded from 4.6
million vehicles in 1990 to 6.1 million in 1994-a 33% in-
crease.35 During the same period, the U.S. car market enjoyed
only a 6% volume increase, from 6.8 million cars in 1990 to 7.2
million in 1994.36 The Big Three produced more than 85% of the
light trucks sold in the United States in 1994, while European
manufacturers produced less than 1%. 3 7 Commentators have
reported that consumers are purchasing light trucks to replace
passenger cars, noting the light truck segment's growing share
of the total U.S. motor vehicle market.38
American and Japanese manufacturers are well repre-
sented in each segment of the U.S. car market, while European
producers-with the single exception of Volkswagen-compete
in only the upper mid-range, luxury, and specialty car seg-
32. See 1985 Market Data Book, supra note 12, at 24; 1990 Market Data
Book, supra note 31, at 27; 1995 Market Data Book, AUTOMOTVE NEWS, May
24, 1995, at 28. At the behest of the U.S. government in 1981, Japan instituted
voluntary controls on the number of cars exported to the United States. Greg
Johnson, Free Market Again? Export Flood Unlikely, Despite End of VRA, IN-
DUSTRY WK., Apr. 1, 1985, at 17. Without such controls, the Japanese share of
the total U.S. import market likely would have been even larger.
33. 1995 Market Data Book, supra note 32, at 30. Different commentators
may use different terminology or subdivide the market into a different number
of segments, but the basic idea remains the same. See, e.g., MAXTON &
WORMALD, supra note 31, at 61-65 (dividing the market into subcompact, com-
pact, mid-size, full-size luxury, small-specialty, and mid-specialty segments).
34. 1995 Market Data Book, supra note 32, at 30; Phil Katcher, Where is
the Market Going?, AuToMoTIvE MARKETING, June 1, 1993, at 47.
35. 1995 Market Data Book, supra note 32, at 28.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Katcher, supra note 34, at 47.
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ments.39 These segments accounted for sales of 2 million cars in
1994, 23% of the total U.S. car market.40
The Big Three sold 5.7 million cars41 and 5.2 million light
trucks42 in the United States in 1994, and reported record earn-
ings of $13.7 billion on total revenues of $335.6 billion.43 The
domestic motor vehicle industry used nearly 20 million tons of
steel (20% of domestic steel production),44 employed over
800,000 American workers (5% of the domestic manufacturing
labor force), 45 and sold more than $400 billion in retail goods
(20% of total domestic retail sales).4 6
B. U.S. AUTOMOBILE FUEL ECONOMY REGULATIONS AND
ExcISE TAXES
1. Fuel Economy Legislation
The U.S. government recognized long ago that the domestic
automobile industry is among the most important political con-
stituencies in the country.47 The successes and failures of the
39. See 1995 Market Data Book, supra note 32, at 25, 30. Volkswagen,
which sold slightly more than 90,000 cars in the United States in 1994, com-
petes in only the budget, mid-range, and sporty car segments. Id. The other
European car manufacturers, such as BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, Volvo, Rolls-
Royce, Ferrari, and Lamborghini, offer cars that compete in only the more ex-
pensive segments. Id.
In 1994, European imports accounted for 12% of the upper mid-range seg-
ment, 19% of the luxury segment, and 18% of the specialty segment. See id. at
30. Domestic manufacturers dominated the upper mid-range and luxury seg-
ments, and Japanese manufacturers accounted for close to half of the specialty
segment in 1994. See id. at 30.
40. Id. at 25, 30.
41. Id. at 28. Domestic manufacturing facilities operated by Japanese auto
makers accounted for sales of an additional 1.4 million new cars. Id.
42. Id.
43. Big Three Bask in Big Bucks, WARD'S AuTo WORLD, Mar. 1995, at 31.
44. Matthew J. Doherty, Curtains Drop on Steel Boom, CINCINNATI EN-
QuiRER, July 2, 1995, at G1.
45. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrIED STATES
1995 417 (1995).
46. Id. at 782.
47. Examples of this recognition include the Nixon Administration's action
to repeal the 7% automobile excise tax in 1971 and the Reagan Administration's
negotiation of the Voluntary Restraint Agreement with Japan in 1981. See
supra notes 18 and 32. The bailout of Chrysler Corp. in 1980, however, is per-
haps the most telling event in this regard. After years of requesting relief from
federal fuel economy and emissions regulations, Chrysler's financial position
finally became precarious enough to elicit $1.2 billion in federal loan guaran-
tees. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 17, at 557-59. These loan guarantees, com-
bined with extensions of credit from trade creditors and the company's
liquidation of its tank division and European manufacturing facilities, enabled
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Big Three affect employment, the balance of trade, air pollution,
national dependence on foreign oil, and a variety of other public
issues. The U.S. government's frustration with OPEC, however,
sometimes overshadowed even its concern for the short-term
profitability of the Big Three. At the height of the fuel crises of
the 1970s Congress enacted laws designed primarily to diminish
the American appetite for gasoline. Rather than impose taxes to
increase the pump price of gasoline and thus decrease the quan-
tity demanded by consumers, Congress chose to impose fuel
economy regulations on automobile manufacturers to decrease
the quantity of fuel-inefficient cars available in the market.48
a. The CAFE Law
In 1975, the United States enacted the CAFE law as part of
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.49 The CAFE law im-
poses a penalty on any automobile manufacturer that fails to
meet the fuel economy standard5" for either its domestic fleet or
its imported fleet. Each fleet's average fuel economy is calcu-
lated and, if below CAFE standards, penalized separately. 51
Congress included this separate foreign fleet accounting require-
ment after intense lobbying by the United Automobile Workers
Chrysler to narrowly avert bankruptcy in the early 1980's. Id. Chrysler ulti-
mately reaped huge financial rewards as a result of its successful front-wheel
drive K-cars and minivans. Id. at 565-66.
48. Many commentators have opined that excise taxes on gasoline would
be a more efficient mechanism to decrease domestic fuel consumption. See, e.g.,
Pietro S. Nivola & Robert W. Crandall, The Extra Mile: Rethinking Energy Pol-
icy for Automotive Transportation, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 1995, at 30; Gary
Fauth, Regulating the Automobile: Learning From Cost-Effective Analysis, Bus.
ECON., Oct. 1994, at 23. Although the CAFE law is the end-result of Congress'
original fuel conservation objective, the regulation only indirectly affects total
automobile fuel consumption, which is the product of miles driven and fuel
economy. Fuel taxes or fuel rationing would directly affect total fuel consump-
tion and would thus be the most efficient and effective methods of furthering
fuel conservation goals. Such methods were evidently too unattractive from a
political perspective, however, for Congress to consider them seriously.
Experts also contend that the popular technique of decreasing vehicle
weight in order to meet fuel economy regulations has led to a decrease in vehi-
cle safety. Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy
Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97, 100 (1989).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, 901-10 (current version at 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 32901-19 (West Supp. 1995)).
50. CAFE came into effect in 1978, and required fuel economy of at least 18
miles per gallon to avoid penalties. Id. at 902. The legislation called for fuel
economy improvement over time until 1985, when the standard reached 27.5
miles per gallon. Id. This standard remains in effect today. 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 32902 (West Supp. 1995).
51. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32904(b) (West Supp. 1995).
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to address the concern that the Big Three would rely on foreign
manufacturing facilities to produce the massive amount of
small, fuel-efficient cars that would be necessary to comply with
the new law.
52
The U.S. government continues to look to the law as a
means of inciting the Big Three to develop new fuel efficiency
technologies. 53 As a practical matter, however, CAFE's mechan-
ics have allowed domestic manufacturers to avoid penalties. 54
For example, light trucks are subject to a much lower CAFE
standard than that imposed on automobiles. 55 Of the $263 mil-
lion in CAFE penalties assessed from 1980 to 1992, European
manufacturers paid more than 99% of the total.56
52. Back to the Sad CAFE, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1985, at 30; UAW Backs
CAFE Goals, FOUNDRY MGMT. & TECH., Nov. 1989, at 8. In 1981, the Chairman
of Ford Motor Co. described these requirements as protectionist, because they
effectively prevented manufacturers from moving small car production offshore.
The Automobile Crisis and Public Policy, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at
73, 80. This view is supported by CAFE's legislative history:
[The] committee did not want the auto efficiency tax to provide a stim-
ulus to increased imports of autos in view of the depressed state of the
U.S. auto industry. The auto efficiency tax in the bill is designed to
provide a significant amount of gasoline conservation without having
an adverse effect on American jobs.... Furthermore, since a U.S. man-
ufacturer who is also an importer must meet the standards on both his
U.S. fleet and his imports separately in order to avoid tax, there is in-
centive to build fuel-efficient cars in the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 221, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15 (1975) (considering an early
version of CAFE as part of the Energy Conservation and Conversion Act of
1975).
53. Max Gates, Environmentalist Seeks 60% Hike in CAFE: Clinton Panel
Targets Emissions, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 8. In 1990, Congress
debated a bill that would increase the CAFE requirement from 27.5 miles per
gallon to 40 miles per gallon over several years. Id. Although Congress has yet
to take any action in this regard, many continue to advocate raising CAFE stan-
dards. Id.; Jayne O'Donnell, Auto Future Hits a Roadblock: Washington Meet-
ings Devolve into Car Not Talks, AUTOWEEK, Oct. 2, 1995, at 4.
54. CAFE's weighted-average calculation operates to the benefit of full-line
manufacturers like the Big Three, which have the ability to offset low-mileage
models with the high-mileage models that they sell in great quantity. The law
also allows manufacturers to earn credits for exceeding the CAFE standard in
any given year and apply the credits against poor performance in any subse-
quent year. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32903 (West Supp. 1995).
55. 1995 Market Data Book, supra note 32, at 58. The 1994 CAFE stan-
dard for trucks was 20.6 miles per gallon, roughly 25% lower than the 27.5
miles per gallon requirement for cars. See id. The Big Three produce the over-
whelming majority of light trucks sold in the United States. See supra text
accompanying note 35. For purposes of CAFE, minivans and sport-utility vehi-
cles are light trucks. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 32901 (West Supp. 1995); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 523.4, 523.5 (1995).
56. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 3.220.
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b. The Gas-Guzzler Tax
In 1978, as part of the Energy Tax Act,5 7 the United States
enacted an excise tax (Gas-Guzzler Tax) on sales of domestic and
imported automobile models that fail to meet certain fuel effi-
ciency standards. For Gas-Guzzler Tax purposes, manufactur-
ers determine the fuel efficiency of each model, and the tax
applies to the sale of an automobile if that automobile model's
fuel efficiency falls below federal standards.58 The Gas-Guzzler
Tax applies to each automobile produced by a manufacturer, as
opposed to CAFE which applies to a manufacturer's fleet as a
whole.
Congress doubled the Gas-Guzzler Tax in 1990,5 9 when 44
of the 47 model types subject to the tax were of European manu-
facture. 60 Like the CAFE law, the Gas-Guzzler Tax allows do-
mestic manufacturers to avoid much of the burden.61 Light
trucks again receive favored treatment, as they are not subject
to the Gas-Guzzler Tax at all. 62 In 1992, European cars ac-
counted for 85% of total Gas-Guzzler Taxes.63
57. Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174, 3180-84 (1978) (current version at 26
U.S.C.A. § 4064 (West Supp. 1995)).
58. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4064 (West Supp. 1995). The law came into effect in
1980, at which point gas-guzzler taxes applied to automobile models with fuel
economy below 15 miles per gallon. Id. The threshold increased annually until
1986, when the tax applied to automobile models with fuel economy below 22.5
miles per gallon. Id. This threshold remains in effect today. Id.
59. Pub. L. 101-508, § 11216, 104 Stat. 1388-437 (1990). Congress debated
doubling the Gas-Guzzler Tax in 1988 as well, at which time New York Senator
Alfonse D'Amato supported the proposed tax increase by observing that "[tihere
are absolutely no domestic-made cars that are impacted by this tax." 134 CONG.
REC. 1, 650-51 (1988).
60. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 3.110.
61. The Gas-Guzzler Tax allows manufacturers to average the mileage of
different model configurations within a specific model type. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4064(b)(3), (c)(1) (West Supp. 1995). Although the average is weighted by
sales of each model configuration, manufacturers who, like the Big Three, offer
multiple configurations of each model type clearly benefit from the averaging
mechanism. Further, the Tax requires manufacturers to include only the high-
est selling configurations in the model type average; additional configurations
can be factored in at the manufacturer's discretion. United States: Taxes on
Automobiles, supra note 4, at paras. 2.12-.13. In some cases, this averaging
mechanism allows manufacturers to avoid Gas-Guzzler Taxes on cars that actu-
ally perform below the threshold, if other configurations of the same model per-
form above the threshold.
62. For purposes of the Gas-Guzzler Tax, minivans and sport-utility vehi-
cles are light trucks. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4064(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1995); 49
U.S.C.A. § 32901 (West Supp. 1995); 49 C.F.R. §§ 523.4, 523.5 (1995).
63. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 3.111.
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2. Luxury Tax
In 1990, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act,64 the United States enacted an additional excise tax (Lux-
ury Tax) on retail sales of certain expensive goods. The Luxury
Tax applied to sales of cars over $30,000, boats over $100,000,
aircraft over $250,000, jewelry over $10,000, and furs over
$10,000.65
Various parties influenced the Luxury Tax price threshold
amounts. The threshold for cars vacillated between $20,000 and
$30,000 in different pre-enactment versions of the Luxury Tax.66
Within this range, a higher threshold is preferable for domestic
manufacturers and a lower threshold is preferable for EC manu-
facturers. 67 Assuming that Congress was determined to levy a
luxury tax on cars selling above some price between $20,000 and
$30,000, domestic auto makers got the best threshold possible.68
64. Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-438 to -444 (1990) (current ver-
sion at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-04 (West Supp. 1995)).
65. Id. The law included exemptions for cars, boats, and aircraft used pri-
marily for business purposes (e.g., taxicabs, commercial fishing boats, and com-
pany jets). Id.
66. When first introduced in Congress, the Luxury Tax bill specified that it
would apply to car sales over $25,000; domestic automobile industry represent-
atives lobbied for the increase to $30,000. Robert M. McElwaine, The War Be-
tween the Imports; the Import Automobile Business in the United States, AUTO
AGE, Aug. 1991, at 10. See also Bill Montague, Congress Weighs Tax on Trap-
pings of Rich, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 1990, at B1 (noting that a $25,000 thresh-
old would affect only 10% of all cars sold in the United States). In 1987
Congress considered an automobile luxury tax with a price threshold as low as
$20,000. First Submission of the United States to the Panel on United States -
Taxes on Automobiles at para. 211 (Oct. 22, 1993). GATT Dispute Resolution
Panel, United States: Taxes on Automobiles, GAIT Doc. DS31/R, (panel report
not adopted), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397, para. 1.1 (1994).
67. In the United States: Taxes on Automobiles proceeding, U.S. represent-
atives asserted (using EC estimates) that a $20,000 threshold would affect 9.7%
of U.S. car production and 71.6% of European imports. United States: Taxes on
Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 3.97. The $30,000 threshold, in contrast,
affects 2% of domestic production and 38.5% of European imports. Id. at paras.
3.90, 3.97. The lower threshold thus increases the number of American cars
subject to the tax by a factor of nearly five but doesn't even double the number
of European cars subject to the tax.
Most Americans spend less than $20,000 when buying a new car; when the
Luxury Tax came into effect in 1991, the average new car cost around $16,500
in the United States. Id. at para. 3.93; see also 1993 Market Data Book, AUTO-
MOTIVE NEWS, May 26, 1993, at 61 (reporting that 1991 new car transaction
prices averaged $16,150 for domestic cars and $18,200 for imported cars).
68. Although imported car dealers lobbied against the Luxury Tax from the
beginning, the Big Three mounted no serious opposition to the tax until re-
cently. See infra note 69. See also Lornet Turnbull, Luxury Levy Less Taxing
for Big 3, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 29, 1993, § 17, at 7 (asserting that General Motors
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Soon after Congress enacted the Luxury Tax, debate began
regarding its repeal. 69 In 1993, Congress eliminated the Luxury
Tax on boats, aircraft, jewelry, and furs, but retained the tax on
automobiles, raising the threshold sale price to $32,000.70 The
U.S. government collected $226 million and $311 million in au-
tomobile Luxury Taxes in 1991 and 1992, respectively. 71 Unfor-
tunately, neither the U.S. government nor any other entity has
compiled comprehensive independent data with regard to the
make of cars subject to the Luxury Tax.72
supported the Luxury Tax because it provides a competitive advantage); Ameet
Sachdev, Full Assault on Luxury Tax on Cars, CH. TRIB., June 18, 1995, § 17,
at 2 (quoting a National Automobile Dealers Association representative's state-
ment that the Big Three avoided opposition to the Luxury Tax because it af-
forded a competitive advantage).
69. See, e.g., Hearing to Examine the Impact of the 10 Percent Luxury Tax
on Small Businesses: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Small Business,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The overwhelming majority of the testimony
presented at congressional hearings on the Luxury Tax concerned its devastat-
ing effects on the domestic boat manufacturing industry. See id. Of the ten
industry representatives who presented statements to the Senate Committee
on Small Business, only one represented a constituency associated with auto-
mobile manufacturing: Gary Olin of the American International Automobile
Dealers Association testified regarding the negative impact of the Luxury Tax
on sales of imported cars. See id. at 58-63. In contrast, six boat industry repre-
sentatives from manufacturing and retailing associations, the Union of Ship-
building Workers, and private businesses presented testimony at the hearings.
See id.; see also Miscellaneous Tax Bills-1991: Hearings on S. 90, S. 150, S.
267, S. 284, S. 649, and S. 913 Before the Subcommittee on Taxation of the Sen-
ate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
70. Pub. L. 103-66 § 13161(a), 107 Stat. 449 (1993) (amending 26 U.S.C.
§ 4001).
71. Response of the United States to the Panel's Questions Regarding the
Luxury Tax at Attachment A-4, United States: Taxes on Automobiles.
72. Many commentators and industry analysts believe that European cars
account for the bulk of Luxury Tax collections. See, e.g., Turnbull, supra note
68, at 7 (noting the statement of Susan Jacobs, president of a luxury car market
analyst group, that "[there is no question that the impact of the tax has fallen
almost exclusively on foreign brands"); Jim Henry, Europeans See Luxury Tax
as Slap, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 23, 1993, at 3 (noting that in 1993, 52 series
of European cars had models with base prices above the $32,000 threshold, as
opposed to only 11 series of American cars and 9 series of Japanese cars).
In connection with the United States: Taxes on Automobiles dispute resolu-
tion proceeding, the European Community commissioned an expert report for
the purposes of estimating the Luxury Tax burden borne by European and
American manufacturers. The expert found that 70% of the total Luxury Tax
assessed in 1992 was associated with sales of European cars. The United
States used a different methodology to estimate the comparative burden borne
by each group of manufacturers, and concluded that the burden was shared
more equitably. The United States methodology, however, resulted in an esti-
mated total Luxury Tax amount that exceeded by more than 20% the total
amount actually assessed by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The EC report
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C. GATT's LIMITATIONS ON INTERNAL TRADE RESTRICTING
MEASURES
The GATT operates essentially as an international dormant
commerce clause, ensuring that individual governments refrain
from unreasonably interfering with the flow of goods across in-
ternational borders. GATT Article III addresses "internal" taxes
and regulations. 73 This includes taxes and regulations that, un-
like tariffs and quotas, are imposed after products clear customs.
Under Article III, imported goods are to receive "national treat-
ment" for purposes of internal taxation and regulation.74
reconciled to IRS information within three per cent. United States: Taxes on
Automobiles, supra note 4, at paras. 3.8-3.21.
To determine the relative burdens of the luxury tax on domestic and EC
producers, each party estimated the actual transaction prices at which dealers
sold their cars. Both parties started with the manufacturer's suggested retail
price ("MSRP"), which is readily available for any car sold in the United States.
The parties diverged, however, in their approaches to adjusting MSRP to ac-
count for options and discounts. Essentially, the EC asserted that the average
car sells at a price 10% below MSRP and the United States asserted that the
discount should be 4%. Id.
73. GATT, supra note 2, art. III, para. 1. The Luxury Tax, for instance, is
assessed at the point of sale to the consumer and is thus an internal tax for
purposes of Article III. The full text of Article HI:2 provides that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Id. at para. 2. Paragraph four of Article III prescribes similar limitations on
protectionist internal regulations other than taxes. The full text of Article III:4
provides that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclu-
sively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product.
Id. at para. 4.
74. Imported goods are to be treated no worse than domestically produced,
or "national," goods. See supra note 3. The second sentence of Article 111:2 ex-
plicitly invokes the national treatment provisions set forth in Article 111:1 with
regard to application of taxes and internal charges. See supra note 73. The
national treatment concept differs from the most favored nation obligation of
Article I, which seeks to ensure that all goods imported from parties to the
GATT are treated similarly regardless of country of origin. See GATT, supra
note 2, art. I, para. 1.
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Article 111:2 provides that imported goods will not be subject
to taxes or other charges in excess of those applied to "like do-
mestic products."75 The text of Article III suggests a two-part
examination: 1) whether the imported and domestic products
concerned are "like," and 2) whether the internal taxation or
other regulation discriminates against the like imported
product.76
Until recently, GATT panels in Article III cases employed a
rather mechanical "like products" analysis that focused on the
physical characteristics and end-uses of the products involved.
In 1987, for example, a panel found that certain Japanese liquor
taxes violated Article III after such an analysis. 77 The Panel
summed up the relevant considerations to include "not only ob-
jective criteria (such as composition and manufacturing
processes of products) but also the more subjective consumers'
viewpoint (such as consumption and use by consumers)."78 The
Panel found that Japanese shochu and imported vodka "could be
considered as 'like' products in terms of Article 111:2 because
they were both white/clean spirits, made of similar raw materi-
als, and their end-uses were virtually identical (either as
straight 'schnaps' [sic] type of drinks or in various mixtures)."79
The Panel noted that "the aim of Article 111:2 of ensuring neu-
trality of internal taxation as regards competition between im-
ported and domestic like products could not be achieved if
differential taxes could be used to crystallize consumer prefer-
ences for traditional domestic products."80
75. See supra note 73.
76. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Japan: Customs Duties, Taxes and
Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, BISD 34th
Supp. 83, para. 5.5(d) (1987) (panel report adopted Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter
Japan: Alcoholic Beverages] (citing GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, EEC:
Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, BISD 25th Supp. 49 (1978) (panel report
adopted Mar. 14, 1978)).
77. Id. at para. 5.6.
78. Id. at para. 5.7.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Panel also concluded that Article III prohibits protectionist tax
treatment of imported products relative to "directly competitive or substitut-
able" domestic products. Id. at para. 5.7. The Panel found that shochu, vodka,
and all other distilled liquors were directly competitive or substitutable, be-
cause "the flexibility in the use of alcoholic drinks and their common character-
istics often offered an alternative choice for consumers leading to a competitive
relationship." Id.
GATT Ad Article III provides the following insight relevant to the interpre-
tation of Article 111:2:
A tax conforming to the requirements of paragraph 2 would be consid-
ered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
480 [Vol. 5:467
UNITED STATES-TAxES ON A UTOMOBILES
Although independent from the GATT dispute resolution
system, the European Court of Justice has employed a similar
analysis in cases arising under Article 95 of the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty.81 In Humblot v. Directeur Des Serv-
ices Fiscaux,8 2 the court considered a French tax on automobiles
based on horsepower rating. Under the French law, all
automobiles were subject to an annual tax that was progressive
up to a certain horsepower rating, above which a special, much
higher tax applied.8 3 The court found that only foreign manu-
facturers produced cars above the special tax power threshold
and thus concluded that the special tax was inconsistent with
Article 95:
The... additional taxation is liable to cancel out the advantages which
certain cars imported from other Member States might have in con-
sumers' eyes over comparable cars of domestic manufacture .... In
that respect the special tax reduces the amount of competition to which
cars of domestic manufacture are subject and hence is contrary to the
principle of neutrality with which domestic taxation must comply.8 4
The court's holding depended upon its finding that cars above
and below the special tax threshold competed against one an-
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the
taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substi-
tutable product which was not similarly taxed.
GATT, supra note 2, Ad art. III, para. 2. The text of Article 111:2 and Ad Article
III thus leads to two separate determinations: first, whether imported products
are taxed more than like domestic products; and second, whether imported
products are taxed differently than directly competitive or substitutable domes-
tic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. The line between
like products on one hand and directly competitive and substitutable products
on the other appears to be quite fine. Ad Article III would be meaningless, how-
ever, if its language were not more expansive than that of Article 111:2, first
sentence. This interpretation is implicit in Japan: Alcoholic Beverages; shochu
and vodka were like products, but shochu, vodka, and all other distilled liquors
were directly competitive or substitutable products.
81. The text of Article 95, practically identical to that of GATT Article 111:2,
provides that:
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products
of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of
that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. Fur-
thermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other
Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indi-
rect protection to other products.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, [EEC TREATY] art.
95 (as amended 1987).
82. Case 112/84, 1985 E.C.R. 1367.
83. Id. at 1376. At the time of the complaint, the special tax was FF 5,000
and the highest rate of the progressive tax was FF 1,100. Id.
84. Id. at 1379.
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other in the market.8 5 In GATT Article III terms, the two
groups of cars were "directly competitive or substitutable prod-
ucts," if not "like products."
In 1992, a GATT panel considering a variety of U.S. state
and federal measures affecting alcoholic beverages established
the modern Article III like products analysis.8 6 The United
States: Alcoholic Beverages panel found that "the limited pur-
pose of Article III has to be taken into account in interpreting
the term 'like products' in this Article."8 7 Under this interpreta-
tion, the imported and domestic goods at issue are like products
only if the tax distinction is applied "so as to afford protection to
domestic production."88
One of the many regulations at issue in United States: Alco-
holic Beverages was a Mississippi state tax on wine that afforded
special treatment to wine produced from a grape that grows only
in the southeastern United States and the Mediterranean re-
gion.89 After noting that this was a "rather exceptional basis for
a tax distinction" and that the tax treatment implied "a geo-
graphical distinction which affords protection to local production
of wine to the disadvantage of wine produced where this type of
grape cannot be grown," the Panel concluded that the Missis-
85. Id. The court observed that French consumers "would naturally choose
from among cars above and below the critical power rating laid down by French
law." Id. It is important to note that the court found only the special tax offen-
sive; the plaintiff did not allege that the progressive tax violated Article 95. The
court suggested that the progressive tax was in keeping with the provisions of
Article 95: "[Mlember States are at liberty to subject products such as cars to a
system of road tax which increases progressively in amount depending on an
objective criterion, such as the power rating ... " Id. at 1378. The court contin-
ued, however, to provide an important limitation, stating that a progressive tax
is "compatible with Article 95 only in so far as it is free from any discriminatory
or protective effect." Id.
86. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States: Measures Affecting Al-
coholic and Malt Beverages, BISD 39th Supp. 206 (1992) (panel report adopted
June 19, 1992) [hereinafter United States: Alcoholic Beverages]. Support re-
mains, however, for the mechanical Article III like products analysis. A WTO
dispute settlement panel recently followed the Japan: Alcoholic Beverages ap-
proach in its like products examination under Article 111:4. WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Panel, United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, para. 6.8 (1996).
87. United States: Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 86, at para. 5.25. Ac-
cording to the Panel, this limited purpose did not include infringing upon na-
tional and state fiscal and regulatory powers, except to the extent that such
powers were used to afford protection to domestic production. Id.
88. Id. (quoting GATT, supra note 2, art. Ill, para. 1).
89. Id. at para. 5.26.
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sippi wine tax was inconsistent with Article 111:2.90 The Panel
applied this like products analysis to each of the facially neutral
measures challenged under Article 111.91
By considering the purpose of a challenged measure as well
as the physical characteristics of the products involved, the mod-
ern approach to Article III allows governments more freedom to
employ regulations with genuinely inadvertent and insignificant
disproportionate burdens upon foreign producers. The United
States: Alcoholic Beverages panel, however, may have opened
the door to an interpretation of Article III that significantly ex-
pands GATT's tolerance of regulatory protectionism.
II. UNITED STATES: TAXES ON AUTOMOBILES SLAMS
THE BRAKES ON ARTICLE 111:2
The United States: Taxes on Automobiles Panel began its
like products analysis by noting that two products could never
be exactly the same in all respects. 92 Following the lead of
United States: Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel abandoned strict
textual interpretation 93 and considered Article III's policy objec-
90. Id. The Panel made clear that it considered the second sentence of Ar-
ticle IH:2 distinct from the first sentence:
[Elven if the wine produced from the special variety of grape were con-
sidered unlike other wine, the two kinds of wine would nevertheless
have to be regarded as 'directly competitive' products in terms of the
Interpretive Note to Article 111:2, second sentence, and the imposition
of a higher tax on directly competing imported wine so as to afford pro-
tection to domestic production would be inconsistent with that
provision.
Id.
91. Id. at paras. 5.73-.77. Like product issues arise in Article III:4 claims
as well as Article 111:2 claims. For instance, the United States: Alcoholic Bever-
ages panel determined that 3.2% beer and beer with higher alcoholic content
were not like products for purposes of Article III:4. Id. In its determination,
the Panel noted that the regulatory distinction was facially neutral, that both
domestic and foreign manufacturers produced both types of beer, that "consum-
ers who purchase low alcohol content beer may be unlikely to purchase beer
with a higher alcohol content and vice versa," that "manufacturers target these
different market segments in their advertising and marketing," and that non-
protectionist policy goals explained the distinction. Id. at paras. 5.73-.74.
Unlike Article 111:2, Article III:4 includes no direct reference to the national
treatment provisions of Article 111:1. As a result, Article III:4 does not explicitly
require determination of a regulation's protectionist effect or purpose, as does
the second sentence of Article 111:2. See supra note 73. Nevertheless, the
United States: Alcoholic Beverages panel indicated that Article III requires the
same like product analysis for purposes of both paragraph two and paragraph
four. United States: Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 86, at para. 5.71.
92. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.6.
93. Id. The Panel rejected the mechanical like products analysis, because
legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) government purposes might be served by reg-
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tive to "prohibit regulatory distinctions between products ap-
plied so as to afford protection to domestic production."94 To
carry out this objective, the Panel reasoned that Article 111:2
need only invalidate taxes with the "aim and effect" of protecting
domestic production. 95 Tax distinctions fail this new test if: 1)
protectionism was a "desired outcome and not merely an inci-
dental consequence of the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal,"
and 2) the distinctions accord "greater competitive opportunities
to domestic products than to imported products."96
A. THE LUXURY TAX
The Panel discounted legislative history as a source of en-
lightenment regarding the desired outcome of the Luxury Tax.97
The Panel relied instead on the "wording of the legislation as a
ulatory distinctions between products that were not based on the products' end-
uses, physical characteristics, or other criteria enumerated in prior panel re-
ports. Id. at para. 5.8. Article 111:2 should not prohibit 'government policy op-
tions, based on products, that were not taken so as to afford protection to
domestic production." Id.
94. Id. at para. 5.7. The Panel derived this objective from paragraph one of
Article III, which states essentially that internal regulations "should not be ap-
plied... so as to afford protection to domestic production." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Paragraphs two, four, and five of Article III are stated in mandatory,
rather than hortatory, language and provide specific prohibitions with regard to
internal taxes, regulations, and quantitative restrictions. See supra notes 3, 73
for the complete text of Article III: and 2.
95. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.10. In
other words, the products between which a tax distinguishes are "like products"
only if the aim and effect of the distinction is to afford protection to domestic
suppliers. The Panel found that the phrase "so as to" in Article III: suggested
both aim and effect. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (UNABRIDGED)).
96. Id. The Panel stated that the desired outcome of a particular tax
should be demonstrated by "the instruments available to the contracting party
to achieve the declared domestic policy goal." Id. The Panel recognized that its
like products analysis rendered the second sentence of Article 111:2 impotent:
"Having found in its examination under Article 111:2, first sentence .... that the
measure was not applied so as to afford protection, the Panel concluded that the
measure at issue was consistent also with the Article 111:2, second sentence."
Id. at para. 5.16.
97. Id. at para. 5.12. The Panel suggested that legislative history may be
relevant to the determination of legislative intent but ignored such information
in this case. Id. The Panel noted that the EC had presented statements of
legislators indicating that the Luxury Tax threshold targeted foreign producers;
the Panel's report, however, did not include examples of the statements. Id.
The EC's submissions to the Panel are not publicly available. See supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text for available information regarding the purpose
of the Luxury Tax.
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whole."98 The apparent policy objective of the Luxury Tax was
to generate federal revenue from sales of luxury goods. 99
Determining the effect of the Luxury Tax was not so easy.
After considering conflicting quantitative evidence presented by
the EC and the United States, the Panel remained uncertain
about the actual effect of the Luxury Tax on competitive condi-
tions.100 Qualitative factors proved more useful, however. After
noting that "a selling price above $30,000 did not appear. .. to
be inherent to EC or other foreign automobiles" and that "the
threshold did not appear arbitrary or contrived in the context of
the policies pursued," the Panel concluded that the effect of the
Luxury Tax was not protectionist.'10
Because the Panel found neither protective aim nor protec-
tive effect, automobiles above and below the Luxury Tax price
threshold were not like products for purposes of Article 111:2.102
The distinction between cars above and below the threshold
price was thus consistent with GATT. 0 3
B. THE GAS-GUZZLER TAX
The Gas-Guzzler Tax presented a more complicated set of
facts for the Panel. The Luxury Tax distinguished only between
cars above and below the price threshold. The Gas-Guzzler Tax,
however, distinguished between: 1) cars above and below the
fuel economy standard, 2) cars below the standard and lacking
access to model-type averaging and cars below the standard but
benefitting from model-type averaging, and 3) cars below the
standard and light trucks. 0 4 The Panel evaluated the three dis-
98. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.12.
99. Id. The Panel did not point to specific language in the legislation rele-
vant to its conclusion regarding the aim of the Luxury Tax.
100. Id. at para. 5.13. The EC submitted data indicating that 85% of cars
sold in 1991 at prices just under the Luxury Tax threshold were of domestic
manufacture, while only 40% of cars sold above the threshold were domestic.
Id. The United States estimated that only 42% of cars sold below the threshold
were domestic, and that 90% of cars sold above the threshold were domestic.
Id. See supra note 72 for a description of the analytical bases underlying each
party's estimates.
101. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.14. The
Panel observed further that "many Japanese and other foreign models were in
fact exported to the United States and sold for below $30,000." Id. In addition,
the Panel observed that "there was no sudden transition to a higher tax at the
threshold." Id. Cf Humblot 1985 E.C.R. 1367 (finding that the special tax af-
fected only foreign producers).
102. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.15.
103. Id.
104. Id. at para. 5.23.
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tinctions separately to determine whether Congress made each
distinction with the aim and effect of protecting domestic
production.
The Panel made quick work of the distinction between cars
above and below the fuel economy threshold. The U.S. assertion
that Congress designed the Gas-Guzzler Tax to conserve fossil
fuels carried the day, despite arguments that the U.S. govern-
ment had other more effective and less trade-distorting methods
of furthering this policy goal.105 Similarly, the effect of the Gas-
Guzzler Tax was not protectionist. The Panel disregarded quan-
titative evidence that European automobiles bore the brunt of
the tax, because "the technology to manufacture high fuel econ-
omy automobiles ... was not inherent to the United States, nor
were low fuel economy automobiles inherently of foreign ori-
gin. 10 6 The distinction was thus not protectionist in effect.
With regard to the second distinction, based on model-type
averaging, the Panel found that the United States had articu-
lated policy reasons that justified the distinction. 107 The gov-
ernment's need to obtain fuel economy information quickly
required tests on a limited sample of cars and averaging based
on sales estimates.' 08 The aim of the distinction was thus con-
sistent with the overall fuel conservation goal and not protec-
tionist.10 9 Although the model-type averaging mechanism
might ultimately tax similar cars differently, the Panel con-
cluded that the effect of the distinction was not to protect domes-
tic production. °10 Because foreign manufacturers were not
"inherently" limited to offering a smaller number of model varia-
tions than domestic manufacturers, the distinction's effect was
not to alter the conditions of competition in favor of domestic
production.11 '
The Panel also accepted the offered policy reasons for the
tax distinction between cars and light trucks. The United States
argued that the government desired to avoid Gas-Guzzler Taxes
on vehicles "which for technical reasons owing to their commer-
105. Id. at para. 5.24.
106. Id. at para. 5.25.
107. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.29.
108. Id. To administer the Gas-Guzzler Tax, the government needs fuel
economy information before the manufacturers sell the cars. Assuming that the
manufacturers are ignorant of each model's fuel economy characteristics until
they perform the post-production tests, the gas-guzzler tests must be performed
during the limited time-frame between production and sale.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 5.31.
111. Id.
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cial or utilitarian use had relatively lower fuel economy." 112
Although more efficient means might be available to encourage
higher fuel economy, the Panel found the aim of the distinction
consistent with the fuel conservation objective. 1 3 In a familiar
refrain, the Panel also concluded that, because light trucks were
not inherently of domestic manufacture, the effect of the distinc-
tion was not to afford protection to domestic production. 1 4 The
Gas-Guzzler Tax was thus consistent with Article 111.115
III. FREE TRADE: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE?
The Panel stressed that its approach to solving the myster-
ies of Article III was nothing new,"16 but a thorough review of
the report reveals that a funny thing happened between the li-
quor store and the car lot. Article III's ban on regulatory protec-
tionism had lost much of its punch since the Japanese and U.S.
alcoholic beverages cases. Although the Panel's report-which
the GATT never adopted-fell into the twilight zone between
GATT dispute resolution procedures and the new WTO regime,
the Panel's reasoning may affect future Article III disputes."17
Commentators have speculated that the Panel may have manu-
factured a rationale to appease congressional opponents to U.S.
membership in the WTO. 1 8 In any case, the Panel's reasoning
was neither consistent with that of prior panels nor in the long
term best interests of free international trade.
112. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.33.
113. Id. The Panel noted that many consumers used light trucks and cars
for the same purposes, but concluded that "the efficiency of the measure was not
by itself relevant in assessing its conformity under Article III." Id.
114. Id. at para. 5.34.
115. Id. at para. 5.36.
116. Id. at para. 5.9 ("The Panel concluded that its interpretation was con-
sistent with previous ones.").
117. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that he "would expect
the panel's report to help steer the debate when GATT countries take up trade
and environment issues under the new World Trade Organization." GATT
Panel Rejects Key EU Challenges to U.S. Fuel Conservation Measures, Intl
Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 4, 1994).
118. See supra note 5; see also U.S. Stalling GATT Panel 'Gas Guzzler' Rul-
ing, Sources Say, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) d5 (June 29, 1994) ("To head off con-
gressional criticism while the Uruguay Round accord is before Congress, the
United States is trying to delay or water down the pending panel report, accord-
ing to EU and GATT sources."); Dismayed European Car Makers May Contest
U.S. Car Tax Ruling, Eur. Info. Service, Dec. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library (speculating that the European Union might file a new complaint under
the new WTO system).
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A. NATIONALISM IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT
The Panel based its interpretation of Article 111:2 on that of
the panels in Japan: Alcoholic Beverages1 19 and United States:
Alcoholic Beverages.120 Ironically, the liquor cases laid the foun-
dation for GATT tolerance of facially neutral taxes, even as they
found Mississippi wine and Japanese liquor taxes inconsistent
with Article 111:2.121 These taxes were offensive because the tax
distinctions were unsupported by any objective basis. In the
parlance of the United States: Taxes on Automobiles panel, no
aim other than protectionism explained the tax distinctions.
The European Court of Justice provided further conceptual sup-
port in Humblot, indicating that a progressive tax based on
horsepower was not protectionist.1 22 Like a progressive tax
based on alcohol content,1 23 such a tax boasts the objective basis
that generally legitimizes the purpose of the tax distinction.' 24
The taxes at issue in United States: Taxes on Automobiles, how-
ever, were not so obviously offensive as the Mississippi wine tax
or the extreme French horsepower tax. The Panel was thus
compelled to develop a new mechanism for evaluating facially
neutral regulations under Article III.
119. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing the Japan:
Alcoholic Beverages Panel decision).
120. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (describing the United
States: Alcoholic Beverages Panel decision).
121. Japan: Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 76, at para. 5.5 (c) ("Article 111:2
was designed with 'the intention that internal taxes on goods should not be
used as a means of protection.'") (quoting UN Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment, Reports of Committees, at 61 (1948)); United States: Alcoholic Bever-
ages, supra note 86, at para. 5.25 ("[Tlhe purpose of Article III is not to prevent
contracting parties from differentiating between different product categories for
policy purposes unrelated to the protection of domestic production.").
122. 1985 E.C.R. at 1378. The court noted, however, that the progressive
tax was valid "only in so far as it is free from any discriminatory or protective
effect." Id. (emphasis added).
123. Prior panels have indicated that taxes based on alcohol content are
generally consistent with Article III. See United States: Alcoholic Beverages,
supra note 86, at paras. 5.73-5.77 (finding regulatory distinction between low
alcohol and high alcohol beer consistent with Article III); Japan: Alcoholic Bev-
erages, supra note 76, at para. 5.9(b) (suggesting that tax distinction based on
alcohol content could be objective and thus consistent with Article III).
124. Objectivity is a common thread through various tribunals' conclusions
regarding allegedly protectionist internal trade measures. See, e.g., Japan: Al-
coholic Beverages, supra note 76, at para. 5.9(b); 1985 E.C.R. at 1378 ("Member
States are at liberty to subject products such as cars to a system of road tax
which increases progressively in amount depending on an objective criterion.").
In this context, however, objectivity is a rather indefinite concept.
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1. New in 1995 Models: The Aim and Effect Test
The Panel made some significant leaps to arrive at the "aim
and effect" test. In particular, prior panels had not required
such a clear showing of both protectionist purpose and protec-
tionist result.125 The text of the GATT suggests that Article III
analysis should focus primarily on the protectionist effects of
trade measures. 126 The GATT explicitly provides for considera-
tion of a measure's purpose under Article XX, which provides
guidance as to which aims the contracting parties agree are
legitimate. 127
125. The United States: Alcoholic Beverages panel was not so unequivocal
that Article III prohibited only those measures implemented with protectionist
intent and effect. With regard to the Mississippi wine tax, the Panel stated:
the particular distinction in the Mississippi law in favour of still wine
of a local variety must be presumed, on the basis of the evidence sub-
mitted to the Panel, to afford protection to Mississippi vintners. Ac-
cordingly, the Panel found that the lower rate of excise tax applied by
Mississippi to wine produced from the specified variety of grape, which
lower rate is not available to the imported like product from Canada, is
inconsistent with Article 111:2, first sentence.
United States: Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 86, at para. 5.26. Although the
Panel noted that the only asserted purpose of the distinction was to subsidize
local producers, the report included no explicit conclusion that the purpose of
the distinction was to afford protection to domestic production. Rather, the ap-
parent purpose of the tax distinction was only one of many considerations rele-
vant to determining whether the tax was applied so as to protect domestic
production.
Similarly, with regard to the regulatory distinction between high alcohol
and low alcohol beer, the Panel performed a detailed examination of the intent
and effect of the distinction and ultimately concluded that "there was no evi-
dence. . that the choice of the particular level has the purpose or effect of afford-
ing protection to domestic production." Id. at para. 5.74 (emphasis added).
Further, the Panel made clear that the second sentence of Article 111:2 and
the Ad Note to Article III required an independent determination of whether
the imported and domestic products were directly competitive or substitutable.
See supra note 90.
126. The text of Article II:2 is phrased in terms of effect only. See supra
note 73. Such phrasing makes sense in the context of GATT Article XX. Article
XX allows for exceptions to the obligations created by other articles in the
GATT, including Article III, when such exceptions are related to or necessary to
further certain enumerated policy goals. GATT, supra note 2, art. XX. The
Panel's analysis of a tax distinction's purpose in the context of Article III ren-
ders Article XX impotent. Under the Panel's approach, Article III prohibits
only those measures that are implemented clearly for the purpose of protecting
domestic production. Article XX will obviously not provide exceptions for any
such measures and thus becomes irrelevant.
127. The Panel's approach assumes that protectionism is an acceptable side
effect of any internal measure that is at least arguably aimed at furthering a
non-protectionist goal. Such an assumption is at odds with the GATT in gen-
eral, which attempts to channel protection through tariffs and domestic
subsidies.
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2. Politicians Aim To Please
Even accepting the "aim and effect" test, the Panel endorsed
the proffered U.S. "aims" of the Luxury and Gas-Guzzler Tax
distinctions without much real examination. 128 What legislative
history exists indicates that domestic industry interests influ-
enced the Luxury Tax price threshold. 129 The circumstances
surrounding the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the
Energy Tax Act suggest that the U.S. auto industry negotiated
relatively favorable terms for implementing the fuel economy
legislation as well.1 30
That is not to say that GATT does not allow for protection in any other
forms. Article XX provides for exceptions from GATT obligations when neces-
sary, for example, to protect public morals; to protect human, animal or plant
life or health; to protect national treasures; and to secure compliance with laws
or regulations not inconsistent with other provisions of the GATT. GATT,
supra note 2, art. XX (a), (b), (f), (d). Article XX also excepts measures relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and to the products of
prison labor, among others. GATT, supra note 2, art. XX (g), (e). Article XX's
exceptions to GATT obligations are based on policy goals ostensibly shared by
the contracting parties. The goals of measures satisfying the Panel's interpre-
tation of Article III may or may not be shared throughout the GATT
membership.
128. With regard to the Luxury Tax, the Panel proclaimed that the price
threshold was consistent with "the policy objective apparent in the legislation,
to raise revenue from sales of perceived 'luxury' products." United States: Taxes
on Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.12. The Panel alluded to no specific
language in the act or the legislative history to support the notion that Con-
gress established the price threshold upon finding that the $30,000 price di-
vided the luxury and non-luxury segments of the car market. See supra notes
66-72, 97 and accompanying text.
The Panel found that the Gas-Guzzler Tax distinctions would indirectly
lead to conservation of fossil fuels and were necessary to obtain accuracy and
efficiency. United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at paras. 5.24,
5.29. These observations provided a basis for endorsing the U.S. argument that
the purpose of the distinctions was to conserve fuel. Further, the Panel found
that Congress' legitimate aim in distinguishing between cars and light trucks
for the Gas-Guzzler Tax was to avoid taxing "vehicles which for technical rea-
sons owing to their commercial or utilitarian use had relatively lower fuel econ-
omy." Id. at para. 5.33. The Panel neglected to explain why commuting in a
Range Rover should be considered utilitarian while doing so in a Testarossa
should not. Indeed, the Panel's reasoning begs for evidence that drivers use
sport-utility vehicles predominantly for utilitarian or commercial purposes. See
supra text accompanying note 38.
The Panel discounted the argument that fuel conservation is only inciden-
tally addressed by fuel economy regulation. United States: Taxes on
Automobiles, supra note 4, at para. 5.24. The Gas-Guzzler Tax, as opposed to a
fuel tax, for instance, may or may not effect total fuel consumption. See supra
note 48.
129. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
130. The general economic conditions in the United States, as well as the
influx of imports, in the years preceding CAFE, led to congressional sensitivity
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This might seem like a lot of heavy lifting to find a protec-
tionist aim, but without a comprehensive review of a measure's
real goal, the Panel's approach will allow national governments
to get away with the free trade equivalent of murder. The U.S.
Supreme Court concluded long ago that a superficial examina-
tion of regulatory purpose was insufficient for DCC purposes:
"[The view] that the ordinance is valid simply because it pro-
fesses to be a health measure, would mean that the Commerce
Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action ... save
for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed
purpose to discriminate against interstate goods." 131
The history of the fuel economy regulations can be framed
in a manner that illustrates how protectionism might creep into
otherwise non-protectionist legislation. First, Congress recog-
nizes the problems associated with the oil crises. Debate ensues
regarding various measures-including fuel taxes, gasoline ra-
tioning, and fuel economy taxes and penalties-to reduce the
immense, and growing, amount of gasoline Americans consume
driving their cars. The oil and gas industry lobbies successfully
against the fuel tax, voters indicate that gasoline rationing is
politically unacceptable, and automobile fuel economy regula-
tion emerges as the best option. Domestic automobile industry
interests give up on derailing CAFE and the Gas-Guzzler Tax in
their entirety and lobby instead for legislation that allows do-
mestic producers to suffer less than foreign producers.
to the United Automobile Workers' support for CAFE's separate foreign fleet
accounting requirements. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Congress
also enacted the Gas-Guzzler Tax during this era of paranoia regarding the
growing number of imported automobiles. Congress acknowledged and en-
dorsed the protectionism furthered by the Gas-Guzzler Tax in 1988, when con-
sidering an increase in the tax, and again in 1990, when Congress doubled the
tax. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
The Panel also ignored the possibility that the aims of fuel economy legisla-
tion have changed during the twenty years since Congress passed the laws.
Although fuel conservation may have been the primary goal furthered by CAFE
and the Gas-Guzzler Tax in the 1970's, current circumstances indicate that
these measures have been ineffective in that regard for some time. See supra
notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
131. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (emphasis
added). Unlike the DCC, however, the GATT provides an additional remedy in
certain circumstances even when the challenged regulations are not violative.
GATT Article XXIII allows contracting parties to extract concessions in cases of
"nonviolation" nullification or impairment of GATTr benefits. GATT, supra note
2, art. XXIII. Practically speaking, the nonviolation remedy is available only
when a new regulation effectively negates a recent tariff concession.
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3. The Role of "Inherence" in Assessing Protective Effects
The Panel expressed concern for the "inherent characteris-
tics" of domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers when
evaluating the effects of the challenged measures. 13 2 Unfortu-
nately, the Panel offered little insight into the analytical link
between inherence and protective effects. Apparently, in the
Panel's view, a tax distinction is protective in effect only if inher-
ent characteristics prevent foreign producers from avoiding ex-
cessive regulatory burdens in the long term.
A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. The farmland
of Country A yields apples but no other fruit. Country B's fruit
producers cultivate only bananas, and their harvest always ex-
ceeds domestic consumption. Country B thus exports bananas
to Country A. Ostensibly to reduce the large amount of banana
peels inundating national landfills (and after extensive lobbying
by apple industry representatives citing the rapid bi-
odegradability of apple cores), Country A imposes a 10% excise
tax on all fruit with skin not normally eaten with the fruit itself.
Assuming versatile soil and climate conditions in Country B, the
Panel's analysis would suggest that such a tax has no protective
effect, because Country B's banana producers could shift their
production to apples (or pears, plums, strawberries, etc.). Of
course, such a shift would require several years and a lot of
money, but they could do it. This tax would not result in a pro-
tective effect under the Panel's test.
The Panel's view of inherence disregards economic reality.
Particularly in a capital intensive industry, such as automobile
manufacturing, the costs to a producer of changing market spe-
cialization in foreign markets are astronomical.133 A foreign
producer who, in response to new taxes or domestic regulations,
132. The Panel noted repeatedly that the Luxury and Gas-Guzzler Taxes
took advantage of no "inherent" characteristics of foreign automobile producers.
See supra text accompanying notes 101, 106, 111, 114.
133. Significant economic barriers block new entrants to certain automobile
market segments. The costs associated with new designs, new or reengineered
manufacturing facilities, advertising, and new dealer relationships, among
many other factors required to compete in a new market segment, would be
staggering for any manufacturer. In light of such costs, the limited-line produ-
cers that import the bulk of European cars into the United States are practi-
cally powerless to shift their production to the high volume budget or mid-size
car segments. Foreign full-line manufacturers, such as Renault and Peugeot,
could possibly absorb such costs, which would be lower for them as they already
compete abroad in most segments. These manufacturers, however, abandoned
the U.S. market several years ago. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying
text.
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"chooses" to change or expand its market specialization provides
a significant competitive advantage to "lucky" domestic produ-
cers whose market specializations are unaffected by the new
measures. 134
Further, the Panel justified its conclusion that the Luxury
Tax exploited no inherently foreign characteristics by observing
that Japanese auto manufacturers compete strongly in the
lower-price segments of the U.S. market.'3 5 Such reasoning,
however, effectively tolerates discrimination against one group
of foreign competitors, so long as some other foreign competitors
are not unduly burdened. The Panel would apparently find a
protective effect only when a regulation imposes a disproportion-
ate burden on all foreign producers. The existence of a group of
unaffected foreign competitors does not independently show that
a domestic regulation is non-discriminatory with regard to a dif-
ferent group of foreign competitors.
When assessing a measure's protective effect, inherent
characteristics should be considered in the context of examining
the costs associated with avoiding excess regulatory burdens.
Unless the cost of shifting from the overburdened foreign pro-
ducer's market position to the relatively favored domestic pro-
ducer's market position are insignificant, the regulation creating
the burden is protective, regardless of inherent characteris-
tics.' 36 When the costs of such a shift are extreme, the existing
market positions may effectively be inherent, at least for pur-
poses of the Panel's analysis.
134. For example, a tax that is implemented such that full-line manufactur-
ers can substantially avoid the tax presents a quandary to the foreign limited-
line manufacturer competing in only the tax-burdened segments of the market.
On one hand, the foreign manufacturer can absorb the enormous costs and
risks associated with attempting to become a full-line competitor in the domes-
tic market. On the other hand, it can incur the significant, but not so enormous,
costs associated with paying the tax and providing a competitive advantage in
their market segments to domestic full-line producers, who pay little or none of
the new tax. Regardless of the strategy chosen by the foreign manufacturer,
the tax affords protection to domestic production, at least in the short term.
135. See supra note 101.
136. An exception may be regulations that correct prior distortions of trade.
Instead of protecting domestic industry from foreign competition, such regula-
tions negate protective or otherwise distortive measures undertaken by foreign
governments.
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B. GETTING BACK ON THE ROAD TO FREE TRADE
The Panel's approach could negate the purpose of Article
III, at least in the area of internal taxes. 137 Several alternative
approaches to Article III could preserve its purpose, each satis-
fying nationalist and free trade objectives to varying degrees.
1. Old Textualist Approach
The Japan: Alcoholic Beverages panel strayed little from the
text of Article III. The panel determined whether the imported
and domestic products were alike by focusing on the effects of
the challenged tax distinctions. 13 8 If the taxed imported product
shared certain characteristics (e.g., material content, end-use)
with the untaxed domestic product, the tax distinction violated
Article III. The regulating party could then avail itself of Article
XX to justify a violation.' 3 9
This approach boasts a clean mechanical precision, as well
as predictability. It is vulnerable to criticism, however, particu-
larly in cases involving facially-neutral measures that only inci-
dentally burden imports. Article XX's exceptions are neither broad
nor flexible enough to mollify its critics, who oppose the least re-
strictive alternative requirement implied in several provisions,140
137. The United States: Taxes on Automobiles Panel clearly restricted the
power of Article 111:2; its evaluation of Article III:4 was much less conclusive.
Perhaps because CAFE required classification of foreign and domestic products,
the Panel had an easier time finding the law inconsistent with Article III. The
Panel did not, however, state explicitly that it based its opinion on facial dis-
crimination. See United States: Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 4, at paras.
5.44-5.55. A key issue in both provisions of Article III is that regarding like
products. As stated by previous panels, like products analysis should be the
same for both Article 111:2 and Article III:4. See supra note 91.
138. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The United States: Alco-
holic Beverages Panel considered these factors, as well as the apparent purpose
of the regulatory distinction. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 126-27.
140. Certain provisions under Article XX except only those measures that
are "necessary" to further the approved policy goal. Panels have interpreted
this language to provide exceptions only for measures for which there is no less
trade restrictive alternative means of furthering the policy goal. See, e.g.,
Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
BISD 37th Supp. 200, paras. 73-75 (1990) (panel report adopted Nov. 7, 1990).
In the case of CAFE and the Gas-Guzzler Tax, for instance, Congress had
available to it a variety of less trade-restrictive means of achieving fuel
conservation. Of the available alternatives, many experts favored fuel taxes,
which would have addressed the consumption problem directly and less
expensively. See supra note 48. Also, Congress could have formulated the Gas-
Guzzler Tax without the model-type averaging requirement, and CAFE without
separate foreign fleet accounting. Further, if the U.S. government had simply
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as well as the harsh burden of proof on the regulating
party.14 1
As a practical matter, Article XX would require substantial
reworking before nationalists and environmentalists would sub-
scribe to the textual interpretation of Article III. Considering
the near-Herculean efforts required to implement changes to the
GATT, widespread acceptance of the textual approach is not
likely. 142
2. Modified United States: Taxes on Automobiles Approach
As described above, the textual approach is quite rigid. At
the other end of the spectrum, the Panel's approach in United
States: Taxes on Automobiles condones a great deal of incidental
protectionism. Slight adjustments to elements of the Panel's
test, however, yield an approach that falls somewhere between
the two extremes.
As shown in Figure 1, the Panel would find an internal tax
inconsistent with Article III only if: a) its clear purpose was to
protect domestic production; b) it did, in effect, protect domestic
production; and c) the protective effect was the result of charac-
teristics inherent to foreign producers. A tax lacking one of
these requirements would be consistent with GATT.
The modified United States: Taxes on Automobiles ap-
proach, illustrated in Figure 2, moves away from the nationalist
extreme by tweaking the Panel's considerations. Of course, a
tax that produces no protective effect is consistent with Article
allowed the market to determine the price of gasoline in the first place, the fuel
economy regulations would likely have been unnecessary. See supra notes 17-
25 and accompanying text. High gas prices would have stimulated consumer
demand for fuel-efficient cars in the early 1970's and incited the Big Three to
alter their designs without government action. See supra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text. Similarly, higher progressive income tax rates (among
other alternatives) would serve the same goals as the Luxury Tax without its
trade-restrictive effects.
The least restrictive alternative requirement, coupled with the limited
number of approved policy goals and other aspects of Article XX, restrict each
nation's legislative freedom to a certain extent. For some, notably
environmentalists, this restriction is excessive. See, e.g., Alberto Bernabe-
Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream": Globalization and Harmonization
of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 205, 218-20 (1995).
141. Once a claimant has shown that the challenged measure is inconsistent
with the GATT, the burden of showing that the inconsistency is justified under
Article XX shifts to the regulating nation. United States: Alcoholic Beverages,
supra note 86, at para. 5.41.
142. A WTO panel recently employed the textual approach to like products
analysis in a case under Article 11:4, however. See supra note 86.
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III. The Panel's manipulation of the other two factors, however,
is puzzling. By requiring an avowed protectionist purpose, the
Panel endorses all incidental protection. Panels could avoid the
resulting Dean Milk problem 143 by considering an avowed pro-
tectionist purpose an Article III violation without further
inquiry.
Further, a tax with a protective effect but lacking a protec-
tionist purpose should be valid only if the protective effect is un-
avoidable, given the tax's non-protectionist objective and the
inherent characteristics of foreign and domestic producers. Thisleast restrictive alternative requirement provides legislative
freedom to regulate in such a way that burdens international
trade, but only if such burdens are necessary to achieve non-
protectionist objectives.
This approach fails to consider, however, that a regulation's
incidental protective effects could conceivably be quite extreme
relative to its non-protectionist objectives. This failure can be
remedied by adding another factor to the analysis.
143. See supra text accompanying note 131.
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3. New Purposivist Approach
Future panels will have to find and exploit the common
ground between the free trade and nationalist interpretations of
Article III if the WTO is to realize its full potential. This com-
mon ground might lie in an approach that balances the burden
on free trade imposed by the challenged measures against the
benefit realized as a result of the measures.
This approach is based upon the underlying purpose of Arti-
cle III, much like the panels' interpretations in United States:
Alcoholic Beverages and United States: Taxes on Automobiles.14 4
The measures at issue in United States: Measures Affecting Alco-
holic and Malt Beverages were too black-and-white to flush out
much in the way of balancing benefits and burdens. 145 The es-
sence of the United States: Taxes on Automobiles approach, how-
ever, can be stated in terms of a benefit-burden test: If no
benefit (or "goal" or "aim") other than protectionism can be at-
tributed to the measure, then no burden on free trade is tolera-
ble, but if any benefit other than protectionism can be attributed
to the measure, then any burden on free trade is tolerable. This
test avoids the harshness of the textual approach but swings too
far back into nationalism to achieve anything approaching free
trade.
Under a more neutral purposivist approach, illustrated in
Figure 3, panels would first assess the burden of an internal
lFig ur N. - - 1. p .
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measure on free trade by comparing the imported and domestic
products involved to determine whether the products compete
144. See supra notes 87-88, 94 and accompanying text (describing the
panels' statements of the purpose of Article III).
145. The Mississippi wine tax presented a substantial burden on free trade
and no non-protectionist benefit, while the 3.2 beer regulation presented an in-
significant burden on free trade and substantial non-protectionist benefits. See
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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against one another and then evaluating the measure's effect on
the conditions of competition between the products. Second,
panels would examine the benefits of the measure, in terms of
its apparent goals and results. Like the United States: Taxes on
Automobiles test, if no benefits other than protection of domestic
production are attributed to the measure, then no burden on
free trade would be tolerated. Unlike the United States: Taxes
on Automobiles test, however, non-protectionist benefits would
not grant legislatures carte blanche to incidentally protect do-
mestic industries. Only those measures that result in non-pro-
tectionist benefits exceeding the burden on free trade146 and
that represent the least trade restrictive means available to ob-
tain the same non-protectionist benefits without incurring sub-
stantial additional cost 14 7 would be consistent with Article
111.148
The approach described above is obviously more rooted in
policy than in the specific text of Article 111.149 Other GATT
text, however, provides support for such a balancing test in simi-
lar contexts.
146. A panel estimating benefits and burdens in this context would obvi-
ously be painting with an extremely broad brush. Although comparisons of this
type may sometimes yield inconclusive results, in certain circumstances the re-
sult might be quite clear. In response to Justice Scalia's criticism that balanc-
ing in this context is akin to determining "whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy," Professors Farber and Hudec note the
following:
The case in which such a judgment can most comfortably be made...
is when one of the quantities is zero. It may also be other than nonsen-
sical to assert that the Earth is heavier than a pin is long: after all, the
Earth is very heavy, where a pin is very short.
Farber & Hudec, supra note 1, at 1409 n.19 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
147. This least restrictive means consideration is less stringent than that
found in certain provisions of Article XX. See supra note 140. These provisions
"allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent
with the General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the ex-
tent that such inconsistencies [are] unavoidable." Thailand: Restrictions on Im-
portation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 140, at para. 74.
148. Panels could then consider whether Article XX excepts any measures
found inconsistent with Article III. Article XX remains effective under this ap-
proach, excepting those measures that create burdens in excess of non-protec-
tionist benefits associated with enumerated policy goals. Regardless of the
extent of the regulatory burden, Article XX would except measures necessary to
further enumerated goals.
149. The United States: Taxes on Automobiles Panel may have correctly con-
cluded that the strict textual approach to Article III had to be forsaken in order
to preserve the GATT as a whole. The Panel's approach, however, went so far
that it sacrificed the ultimate goal of free trade.
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The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,150 an annex
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, limits the use of pro-
tective technical regulations.' 5 ' Article 2.2 of the Standards
Code provides that:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regu-
lations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would
create. 1
5 2
As illustrated in Figure 4, this text suggests an analysis sub-
stantially the same as the balancing test described above. Risks
associated with non-fulfillment of the regulation's objective
weigh against the resulting obstacle to international trade. Fur-
ther, the Standards Code explicitly requires that the regulation
be the least trade-restrictive alternative available to achieve the
objective.
The purposivist approach thus results in an Article III anal-
ysis that is more closely tied to the text of the Standards Code
than to that of Article III.153 The alternative, however, is to al-
low protectionism via taxation that is prohibited via technical
regulations. Governments can use either mechanism to achieve
150. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter Standards Code].
151. The Standards Code applies to internal regulations that are also sub-
ject to Article III:4; in these circumstances, the Standards Code preempts Arti-
cle III:4. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 1, at 1429-30.
152. Standards Code, supra note 150, art. 2.2. The phrase "taking account
of the risks non-fulfilment would create" implies a balancing of the risks
targeted by the regulation against the resulting obstacle to international trade(i.e., are the risks worth burdening free trade?). An alternative reading, how-
ever, might not suggest such a balancing. The phrase could refer merely to the
likelihood that objectives will go unfulfilled, rather than the adverse conse-
quences of nonfulfillment. Panels have yet to interpret this language.
153. The parties to the GATT adopted the Standards Code in 1979 in re-
sponse to widespread concern regarding the growing array of conflicting techni-
cal regulations promulgated by individual member nations. R.W. Middleton,
The GATT Standards Code, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 201 (1980). The Standards
Code provided for a system of notification and articulated a commitment to de-
velop international regulations where possible. Id. at 204-08. Although the
Standards Code applies only to technical regulations, as opposed to all internal
measures covered by Article Ill, nothing in the text suggests that internal taxes
were purposefully excluded from the Code's limitations. Rather, the Standards
Code test merely reflects a more recent understanding of the appropriate ap-
proach to evaluating an allegedly protectionist measure.
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similar protectionist (or non-protectionist) ends, 154 and GATT
should therefore apply the same limits to both. 155
U.S. Supreme Court DCC cases provide further support for
the purposivist approach. In Pike v. Bruce Church, the U.S.
Supreme Court provided the following approach for evaluating
154. Taxes and regulations often yield the same results. Although most con-
sider taxes a means of generating revenue and regulations a means of restrict-
ing activities, legislators frequently use taxes as a prod to modify behavior and
regulations to obviate the need for public expenditures.
155. One difference between the two trade-distorting measures is that the
taxing government collects most of the monopoly rents that result from a pro-
tectionist tax, while domestic producers collect most of the monopoly rents that
result from a protectionist regulation. Obviously, governments need no encour-
agement from GATT to choose a tax over a regulation as a means of protection.
Incidentally, consumers pay the monopoly rents that result from either
measure.
500 [Vol. 5:467
UNITED STATES-TAXES ON A UTOMOBIES
the constitutionality of facially neutral state statutes under the
Commerce Clause:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of de-
gree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. 15
6
As illustrated in Figure 4, the Court's analysis employs a bal-
ancing of burdens against benefits and requires that the regula-
tion be the least restrictive alternative available, much like the
Standards Code and the purposivist approach.
Conceptually, the purposivist approach attempts to strike a
middle ground between the harshly anti-protectionist strict tex-
tual interpretation of Article III and the weak nationalist inter-
pretation employed by the panel in United States: Taxes on
Automobiles. Both extremes afford different advantages and
disadvantages. An interpretation of Article III that blends the
two might enable both the GATT and hopes for free interna-
tional trade to survive in the long term.
IV. CONCLUSION
Experienced legislators have discovered that the GATT does
not suffer outright protectionism lightly. The temptation to sat-
isfy powerful domestic industry groups can still influence
lawmakers to tip the regulatory scales against foreign interests.
When the events of the 1970's led Congress to attempt to contain
American dependence on foreign oil, domestic automobile indus-
try representatives helped shape the legislation to minimize the
losses to their constituents. The Gas-Guzzler Tax and CAFE
law may have achieved significant fuel conservation, but they
may also negatively affect the conditions of competition for Eu-
ropean products in certain segments of the automobile market.
Similarly, although the Luxury Tax on cars has provided a
sorely needed source of federal revenue, Congress may have di-
rected its burdens primarily at foreign producers.
The United States: Taxes on Automobiles panel concluded in
1994 that the incidental protectionism resulting from the Gas-
Guzzler and Luxury Taxes was consistent with GATT Article
156. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted).
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III. To the delight of isolationists and environmentalists, the
Panel introduced a new reading of Article III that prohibits only
those measures with both the aim and the effect of protecting
domestic production. The Panel's approach clearly preserves
legislative freedom, but consumers ultimately pay the price of
all protectionism, whether incidental or intentional. Future
panels faced with similar challenges to facially-neutral internal
measures should consider an interpretation of Article III that
preserves the benefits of free trade as well as those associated
with national sovereignty.
